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Lawyers are wordsmiths, not number crunchers. Thus, quanti-
tative or mathematical evidence has long been a source of bewilder-
ment to the profession.' Some years ago, a lawyer-statistician team,
Michael Finkelstein and William Fairley, suggested a modest use of
an elementary formula of probability theory, known as Bayes's for-
mula, to aid jurors in assessing statistical identification evidence. 2
In an eloquent response, Laurence Tribe argued against the pro-
posal on two general grounds.3 First, he offered a variety of practical
reasons to suggest that probabilities calculated according to the
formula would not be as accurate or useful as they might, at first
blush, appear. Second, he pointed out how values other than the
accuracy of factfinding might be undermined by the explicit use of
probability calculations, especially in criminal cases.4 In the suc-
ceeding years, no one took the Finkelstein-Fairley proposal very
seriously, although the question is not as clear-cut as most people
assume.5
More recently, Finkelstein published a slightly revised version
of his earlier proposal.' This time, two law professors, Lea Brilmayer
t Professor of Law, Arizona State University. I am grateful to Dennis Karjala and
David Schum for helpful discussions of the topics treated in this article. Ira Ellman also made
many valuable contributions to this article, which grew out of our work on statistical evidence
in paternity disputes. The text at notes 57-63 infra especially bears his imprint.
See, e.g., State v. Smiley, 27 Ariz. App. 314, 554 P.2d 910 (1976); State v. Sneed, 76
N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966); Moore v. Leininger, 299 Pa. 380, 149 A. 662 (1930); Brilmayer
& Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 116,
135-48 (1978); Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other
Statistical Evidence: A Reply to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457 (1979).
2 Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 489 (1970). For an earlier proposal along these lines, see I. GOOD, PROBABILITY AND THE
WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE 66-67 (1950).
3 Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HAv. L.
REv. 1329, 1350-1378 (1971).
1 Some implications of this observation are explored in Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and
Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1187 (1979).
1 A few courts have admitted Bayesian probability calculations into evidence. These
cases are criticized in Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Testing
Prove Paternity?, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming), in which a more modest use of BVes's
Theorem is defended.
I M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTrrATrVE METHODS IN LAW 78-104 (1978). For further analysis of
the advisability of using Bayes's formula to evaluate statistical identification evidence, see,
for example, Fairley, Probabilistic Analysis of Identification Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STU. 493
(1973); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics, "84 HARv. L. REv. 1801
(1971); Gerjuoy, The Relevance of Probability Theory to Problems of Relevance, 18
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and Lewis Kornhauser, entered into the rather academic debate. In
an article published in this Review, they argued on espistemological
grounds that the proposed use of probability theory might not be
rational or meaningful. 7 Their work is typical of a growing body of
thought that holds that the type of probabilities pertaining to dis-
puted facts in litigation do not obey the usual laws of probability.8
In reaching this seemingly paradoxical conclusion, Brilmayer and
Kornhauser join a two-hundred-year-old debate among logicians,
philosophers, and statisticians concerning the foundations and ap-
plications of probability theory.
In this article I hope to show that the new wave of skepticism
about the application of probability theory to legal factfinding rests
on fundamental misconceptions about the philosophical debate over
the meaning of probability, the character of rational decisionmak-
ing, and the values of the legal system. With respect to the specific
controversy about the use of Bayes's Theorem at trial, I suggest that
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1977); Lindley, Probabilities and the Law, in UTILrrY, PROBABILITY AND
HUMAN DECISION MAKING 223 (D. Wendt & C. Vlek eds. 1975); Tribe, A Further Critique of
Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (1971). Other writers have used probability theory
heuristically, to explain, criticize, and justify various rules of evidence and procedure. See,
e.g., Gelfand & Solomon, Analyzing the Decision-Making Process of the American Jury, 70
J. Am. STATISTICAL A. 305 (1975); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1456 (1979); Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121
(1976); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REy. 1021 (1977); Penrod & Hastie, Models
of Jury Decision Making: A Critical Review, 86 PSYCH. BuLL. 462 (1979).
7 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 135-48.
8 The most elaborate presentation of this thesis can be found in L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE
AND THE PROVABLE (1977). Brilmayer and Kornhauser are impressed with, and reiterate,
some of Cohen's analysis. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 145 & n.103, 146 n.106.
So does Nesson, supra note 4, at 1199 n.27. Brilmayer and Kornhauser, and Nesson, also point
to the work of a statistician, Glenn Shafer, who posits "belief functions" of which mathemati-
cal probability functions are but a special case. G. SHAFER, A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF
EVIDENCE (1976). (Despite its title, Shafer's work is not specifically directed to evidence in
the legal sense. It is a purely mathematical analysis.) Interestingly, Shafer disputes the
adequacy of Cohen's mathematical theory. Id. at 223-25.
Only Brilmayer and Kornhauser take as their explicit target the use at trial of Bayes's
Theorem. Although they acknowledge the assistance of Shafer in preparing their article, it is
not clear that Shafer, as a working statistician, would deny the appropriateness of using
ordinary probability calculations to make judgments about facts, at least when the relevant
probabilities can be estimated with reasonable precision. As Shafer remarks:
The chanes [Shafer distinguishes between "mathematical chance" and "degree of
belief"] governing an aleatory experiment may or may not coincide with our degrees of
belief about the outcome of the experiment. If we know the chances, then we will surely
adopt them as our degrees of belief. But if we do not know the chances, then it will be
an extraordinary coincidence for our degrees of belief to be equal to them.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Cf. Dempster, Foreword to id. at vii ("Bayesian inference will
always be a basic tool for practical, everyday statistics, if only because questions must be
answered and decisions must be taken").
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the only real question is the operationally oriented one whether the
technique would reduce the number of errors in factfinding, and
that the current criticism obscures rather than clarifies the answer
to this question. I begin by analyzing some of the more general
arguments against using probability axioms in the legal context. In
Part I, I reject the contention that discrepancies in the way facts are
proved in- court and the way mathematical probabilities behave
reveal some flaw in the mathematical theory. I argue in Part II that
probability theory, subjectively interpreted, can be applied mean-
ingfully to legal factfinding. I turn specifically to the Finkelstein-
Fairley proposal in Part HI, where I suggest that disputations about
the "real" meaning of probability have little bearing on the logical
propriety of using accepted probability formulae to explain the sig-
nificance of legally admissible statistical evidence to a judge or jury.
Finally, in Part IV, I consider the claim that there may be more
"rational" methods to evaluate statistical evidence than those
based on the mathematical theory of probability. I conclude that
the epistemological brief against probabilistic models of legal fact-
finding is far from convincing.9  o
I. Is PROBABILITY THEORY WRONG?
One prong of the recent attack on the use of probability theory
in legal factfinding and decisionmaking ° holds that the mathemati-
cal theory of probability" produces counterintuitive conclusions
when applied to juridical proof.'" The leading exponent of this view
is L. Jonathan Cohen, a respected British philosopher of science.
Cohen identifies six such "anomalies" which, he asserts, prove that
the mathematical theory of probability is fundamentally inapposite
to legal factfinding.' 3 Cohen finds, for example, the notiofi that the
I It is not clear whether Brilmayer and Kornhauser mean to object to the use of probabil-
ity theory for both heuristic and operational purposes or for just the latter. See note 6 supra.
Their complaints about the axioms of probability theory, however, would seem to commit
them to the view that even the heuristic models may be fundamentally inapposite to under-
standing the way probabilistic facts should be evaluated at trial. See note 59 infra. Nesson,
on the other hand, concedes that the established theory of probability is valuable in legal
analysis for conceptual purposes. Nesson, supra note 4, at 1199 n.27. See also G. SHAFER,
supra note 8, at 22-25.
I* Factfinding can be treated as a species of decisionmaking. See, e.g., Lempert, supra
note 6. See also V. BARNrr, COMPARATivE STATISTIcAL INFERENCE 201 (1973).
"1 By the "mathematical theory of probability," I mean the axiomatized theory pre-
sented in any standard textbook on probability or statistics. See note 28 infra.
12 Brilmayer and Kornhauser similarly suggest that the applicability of the probability
axioms is "particularly doubtful with regard to legal reasoning." Brilmayer & Kornhauser,
supra note 1, at 155.
,3 "There are certainly at least six anomalies involved in any attempt to construe Anglo-
[47:34
Probability and the Law of the Land
probability of a defendant's guilt (or liability) plus the probability
of his innocence add up to one (P(G) + P(not-G) = 1) to be
"paradoxical" when applied to civil cases." To resolve such
"paradoxes," Cohen proposes a detailed mathematical framework
for calculating the very different kind of "probability" he sees at
work in the legal realm.' 5 In his system, the probability that an
event will happen and the probability that it will not happen would
not necessarily add up to one, and neither Bayes's Theorem nor the
other features of the conventional theory would necessarily hold.'6
American standards of juridical proof in terms of mathematical probabilities." L. COHEN,
supra note 8, at 116. For a description of these "anomalies," see id. at 49-115.
11 Cohen's objection is to a probabilistic interpretation of the more-probable-than-not
standard generally applicable to civil liability:
Suppose the threshold of proof in civil cases were judicially interpreted as being at the
level of a mathematical probability of .501. Would not judges thereby imply acceptance
of a system in which the mathematical probability that the unsuccessful litigant de-
served to succeed might sometimes be as high as .499? This hardly seems the right spirit
in which to administer justice.
Id. at 75.
11 Cohen's "polycriterial" theory of inductive "support functions" is quite general and
is meant to apply in a number of other domains. As explained more fully in note 16 infra,
this conception of inductive support "has nothing to do with mathematical probability." L.
COHEN, supra note 8, at 198.
"I The details of Cohen's "inductive probabilities" are concisely outlined in Schum, A
Review of A Case Against Blaise Pascal and His Heirs, 77 MICH. L. REv. 446 (1979). In general
terms:
Inductive probabilities, although they rest upon developments no less carefully reasoned
than mathematical probabilities, have simpler, more primitive, properties.. . . [T]hey
cannot be added, subtracted, multiplied, or divided. Although evidence can change the
probability of an event, we cannot say, for example, that event A is twice as likely as
event B, given relevant evidence. In fact, we can only make what are called ordinal or
ordering relations among inductive probabilities. I can say that, on the evidence, A is
more probable than B, but I can neither say how much more probable nor how many
times more probable.
Id. at 449-50 (emphasis in original).
To arrive at these inductive probabilities, Cohen defines "support functions" of the form
s(H,E), which denote the degree of support for the hypothesis H given certain evidence E.
Mathematically speaking (and omitting certain refinements), a "support function" maps
ordered pairs of propositions (HE) on to the first n+1 integers. In this nomenclature, s(HE)
= 0 means that the hypothesis H is disproved by the evidence acquired from one test that
distinguishes between H and some competing hypotheses-that is, which can disprove at
least one of the hypotheses invoked to explain the phenomenon in question. Similarly, s(HE)
= n/n means that H is not disproved or eliminated by the evidence obtained from n tests
designed-to decide among a set of competing hypotheses that includes H. Thus s(HE) = n/n
implies that H has the highest level of inductive support of all the hypotheses under consider-
ation. Between the extremes s(HE) = 0 and s(HE) = n/n, the degree of support for H is
s(H,E) = i/n, where i is an integer between 0 and n (O<i<n). If s(HE) = i/n, then
the evidence consists of the fact that H survived the first i tests but was disproved by the
(i+l)th. L. COHEN, supra note 8, at 133.
The "inductive probabilities" that ultimately emerge from these support functions be-
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Now, there are a number of ways to respond to this sort of
argument. One could simply dispute the paradoxical quality of the
conundrums Cohen creates. Where, for instance, Cohen insists that
to refuse recovery to a civil litigant who had proved that the proba-
bility the defendant is liable is .499 "hardly seems 'the right spirit
in which to administer justice," 7 one might reasonably suggest that
such an outcome is perfectly appropriate in the uncertain and im-
perfect world of litigation.'8 There is, in addition, a different and
perhaps more decisive rejoinder to Cohen's ambitious argument.
Whatever puzzlement is produced by Cohen's "anomalies" is, I
think, attributable to an underlying misconception about the role
of probability theory in legal proof. Conventional probability theory
does not purport to describe the structure of current legal doctrine.
Rather, it prescribes how probabilistic evidence should be handled
if one is to make the fewest mistakes in predicting the outcome of
uncertain events.' 9 Few people would argue, for example, that there
have differently than the familiar mathematical probabilities. For a summary of their distinc-
tive properties, see id. at 231-40.
Shafer's "belief functions," like Cohen's "inductive probabilities," do not exhibit the
familiar properties of mathematical probabilities, such as the "negation rule" that P(A) +
P(not-A) = 1. In essence, this is because Shafer reasons that one can have a certain degree
of belief in a proposition A (designated Bel(A)), another degree of belief in the negation of A
(denoted Bel(not-A)), and a residual quantity of nonbelief. To the extent that such nonbelief
is present,
Bel(A) + Bel(not-A) < 1.
See G. SHAFER, supra note 8, at 43.
'7 See note 14 supra.
,1 Cohen's arguments as to the difficulty of quantifying the burden of persuasion in civil
cases are considered in more detail in Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other
Stories, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 101. The analysis in Lempert, supra note 6, implicitly helps
resolve some of the other "anomalies" that trouble Cohen and Brilmayer and Kornhauser,
and two of these paradoxes are treated specifically in Wagner, Book Review, 1979 DUKE L.J.
1071. In addition, all the putative paradoxes are examined in Schum, supra note 16, at 463-
71, and Williams, The Mathematics of Proof (pts. 1 & 2), 1979 CRIM. L. REv. 297, 340.
11 Some theorists have expressed this idea by treating the axioms of probability theory
as normative. See, e.g., Carnap, Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions, in 1 STUDIES IN
INDUCTIVE LOoIC AND PROBABILITY 5, 7-9 (R. Carnap & R. Jeffrey eds. 1971). Of course, this
characterization of the theory merely moves the debate to another plane. Since the truth of
a theory cannot be a matter of definition, it must be shown that the axioms that state how
probabilities should be handled are preferable to other formulae. This can be done by con-
structing a pragmatic or positivist argument for the existing mathematical theory. See text
and notes at notes 71-72 infra. Alternatively, one can make an intuitionist argument. An
interesting version of the latter approach is to appeal to the axioms of rational choice familiar
to decision theorists. These axioms, in effect, provide a formal definition of rational behavior.
One such axiom, for instance, requires that preferences be transitive. It states that if outcome
A is preferred to outcome B, and B is preferred to C, then A is also preferred to C. See, e.g.,
C. CooMBS, R. DAWES & A. TvERsKY, MATHEMATICAL PsYCHOLOGY 122-26 (1970); J. VON NEU-
MANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 26 (3d ed. 1953). From
such intuitively attractive postulates, the usual axioms of probability theory can be deduced.
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is some more accurate way to predict whether the first two cards
dealt from a well shuffled deck will be red than to calculate the
probability as (1/2) X (1/2) = .20 The same theory should be no less
accurate for making "postdictions," or findings of fact. If we wish
to decide whether two cards which have already been dealt face
down are red, the most accurate basis for coming to a conclusion
(without peeking) is to rely on the same probability calculation:
(/2) X (/2) = /.21
That the present rules of evidence and procedure do not invari-
ably appear to promote this ideal of accuracy does not impugn the
accuracy of probability theory as a tool in legal factfinding. In some
cases, the law may exclude mathematical probability calculations
precisely to encourage the production of more individualized and
revealing evidence-to permit peeking at the cards, as it were. 22
See, e.g., T. FERGUSON, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS: A DECISION THEORETIC APPROACH (1967);
L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (2d ed. 1972); notes 31 & 32 infra.
To be sure, the definition accepted in decision theory may not provide a philosophically
satisfactory definition of rationality. See, e.g., Kaye, Playing Games with Justice: Rawls and
the Maximin Rule, 6 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. (forthcoming). Nevertheless, there seems to be
no reason in principle why ideal legal factfinding cannot be captured by a model in which
the decisionmaker seeks to maximize expected utility, where the utility function is suffi-
ciently multidimensional, and the familiar sorts of probabilities are used. See generally R.
KEENEY & H. RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES: PREFERENCES AND VALUE
TRADEOFFS (1977); UTILITY, PROBABILITY AND HUMAN DECISION MAING (D. Wendt & C. Vlek
eds. 1975). In this regard, Brilmayer and Kornhauser's suggestion that there may be "ra-
tional" strategies available to jurors other than "maximizing expected value," Brilmayer &
Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 142, is difficult to understand in the absence of some explanation
of what they mean by "value." Presumably, they have in mind something like the "satisfic-
ing" principle as a replacement for utility maximization. See, e.g., DECISION AND ORGANIZA-
TION (C. McGuire & R. Radner eds. 1972); H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 246-60, 261-73 (1957).
Still, it is hard to see why "bounded rationality," to use the economist's jargon, should cause
us to alter the mathematical structure of existing probability theory.
2 This calculation assumes that the first card drawn is reinserted and the deck reshuf-
fled. Without such replacement, the probability of two red cards being dealt would be
(/2) (25/51) = .245
22 Courtroom decisions as to what has occurred are analogous to guessing what happened
when the cards were dealt face down, and accuracy in making predictions thus translates into
accuracy in factfinding. It might seem that a logical positivist would be troubled by this
description, and would prefer to say that when the cards are dealt face down, one is not
making a statement about what has already occurred but rather about what will occur when
the cards are turned over. Cf., A. RAPOPORT, OPERATIONAL PHmLosoPHY 61 (1953) (predictivist
perspective on propositions of historical fact). For present purposes, this is more a matter of
phraseology than substance. Nevertheless, it points up the fact that after the jury decides,
we do not test its "postdictions." In principle, we could. See text and note at note 41 infra.
Hence, to state the analogy more precisely, we can imagine that the cards have been dealt,
that one is constrained by reasons of social policy from turning them over, and that one is
compelled to decide whether they are both red. In these circumstances, if all we desire is the
more accurate guess, we should not hesitate to follow the dictates of probability theory (or to
advise whoever is making the decision of the result of our probability calculation).
" Brilmayer and Kornhauser overlook this point when they note that "a probability
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Consider, for instance, Tribe's argument that the facts that the
plaintiff was negligently run over by a blue bus and that the defen-
dant operates four-fifths of all the blue busses in town should not,
without more, support a verdict for the plaintiff.2 A rule of law
denying the plaintiff recovery in such a case would not establish
that probabilistic reasoning is inapplicable or that jurors would not
be well advised to find facts according to their best estimates of the
relevant probabilities. It would merely reflect the policy that where
individualized evidence is likely to be available-evidence which
would typically permit better estimates of the probabilities than
can be had from the background statistics alone-plaintiffs should
be forced to produce it. In the long run, fewer mistaken verdicts
should result under this rule of law.
In other cases, the fact that legal doctrine does not seem to
conform to probability calculations may be a cause for concern and
reform. 2 Or it may be a consequence of socially important policies
other than accuracy in factfinding. Why is it, for example, that we
make no effort to explain the meaning of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" in precise quantitative terms? Surely it is not some defect
in probability theory that restrains us from instructing jurors that
they should convict so long as they are, say, at least ninety-five
percent certain that the defendant is guilty. A much simpler explan-
ation is that we would prefer not to advertise the fact that we are
willing to sacrifice one innocent person in order to secure the convic-
tion of nineteen guilty ones. Some things, it has been argued, are
best left unsaid.2 Although Cohen recognizes that the legal process
is concerned with more than accuracy in factfinding, he insists that
the mathematical theory of probability must take into account
these other values in describing how the probabilities of disputed
figure that reflects the extent to which a given body of evidence supports an inference, but
not the sufficiency of the evidence itself, cannot adequately capture all the elements of legal
proof." Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 145. For a more detailed analysis of the
"sufficiency of the evidence" problem using the accepted mathematical theory of probability,
see, for example, Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980). See also Ellman & Kaye, supra
note 5.
" Tribe, supra note 3, at 1340, 1341 & n.37.
2, See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 18, at 1076. Cohen is aware of this response to his analysis
but dismisses it as implausible. He writes:
This objection shows a certain contempt for the natural intelligence of lawyers. Their
logicomathematical intuitions must be surprisingly widely fallacious if the objection is
correct. Nor is it at all clear why their pattern of error should be so self-consistent and
uniform.
L. COHEN, supra note 8, at 119-20.
25 See Tribe, supra note 3, at 1372-73. See generally G. CALABRES1 & P. BOBBrrr, TRAGIC
CHOICES (1977).
[47:34
Probability and the Law of the Land
facts should be calculated. It seems more sensible (though less origi-
nal) to say that the probabilities behave as prescribed by the con-
ventional probability axioms, but that the law accepts imprecision
and inaccuracy because other values are at work.26 The putative
anomalies Cohen depicts thus do not compel us to abandon the
established theory of probability at the courthouse door.
II. ARE THE SUBJECTIVISTS RIGHT?
A second prong of the criticism of probability theory in the
context of legal factfinding does not claim that there is something
special about legal proof that makes the axioms of probability
theory inapplicable. Rather, it asserts that the axioms break down
when applied to degrees of belief about the likelihood of uncertain
events. This argument, or some variant of it, is the dominant point
raised by Brilmayer and Kornhauser in their attack on the use of
Bayes's formula as an explicit tool in legal factfinding.21
To see why this view is not persuasive, however, one must un-
derstand the historically competing interpretations of probability
and their connection with the probability axioms. To a mathemati-
cian, probabilities are numbers that obey a few axioms.28 Where the
21 See, e.g., Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979); Tribe, supra note 3, at
1376.
1 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 138, 141-45. The authors argue particularly
that the axiom of additivity, see note 28 infra, does not apply to degrees of belief. Brilmayer
& Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 141-42, 141 n.91. The argument seems to carry the most
weight as applied to unique events, those for which probability estimates cannot be made by
observing repeated outcomes.
The following tongue-in-cheek comment expresses this viewpoint cogently: "[There
is no problem about probability: it is simply a non-negative, additive set function, whose
maximum value is unity." H. KYBURG & H. SMOKLER, STUDIES IN SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 3
(1964). The axiomatic formulation of probability, first presented rigorously in the 1930s,
proceeds by assigning to each event A in a simple space S of all possible outcomes a number
P(A), which indicates the probability that A will occur. To qualify as a probability, this
number must satisfy only three axioms. The first axiom states that the probability of every
event must be nonnegative: P(A) >0. The second axiom states that if an event is certain to
occur, then the probability of that event is one: P(S) = 1. The third axiom provides that if
events have nothing in common with one another (they are disjoint, or mutually exclusive),
then the probability that at least one of these events will occur is the sum of the probabilities
that each will occur: P(UA) = P(A,) + P(A) + . . . See, e.g., M. DEGRooT, PROBABILrY
i=I
AND STATISTICS 12-13 (1975). A weaker form of the third axiom, stating that the probabilities
of a finite set of disjoint events are additive, is also sufficient, but makes for less elegant
derivations of many probability theorems. For more careful, but progressively less accessible
presentations of the probability axioms, see, for example, J. KINGMAN & S. TAYLOR, INTRODUC-
TION TO MEASURE AND PROBABILITY 261-84 (1966); J. NEVEU, MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
CALCULUS OF PROBABILITY 2-25 (A. Feinstein trans. 1965); Jeffrey, Probability Measures and
Integrals, in 1 STUDIES IN INDUCTIvE LOGIC AND PROBABILITY, supra note 19, at 167-221. From
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numbers come from is of no mathematical concern. The mathemati-
cal theory only prescribes what can be done in the way of combining
and manipulating these probabilities, once the numbers are some-
how obtained. Some of the mathematicians who made pioneering
contributions to probability and statistics thought of probabilities
as objectively determined by the number of mutually exclusive,
collectively exhaustive, and "equally likely" outcomes associated
with an experiment. For example, according to Laplace's "principle
of insufficient reason," if we know only that a coin having two sides
is about to be tossed, we should assign to the outcome of heads (or
for that matter, tails) the probability one-half.29 Most contemporary
theorists, however, reject this a priori, or "logical" conception of
probability, and many favor an empirical or "frequentist" interpre-
tation. 0 Under this view, the probability associated with a given
outcome is defined in terms of the relative frequency with which
such an outcome will result on repeated trials.
It bears repeating, however, that neither of these "objective"
definitions is presupposed by the axiomatized mathematical theory.
In fact, there is every reason to believe that numbers arrived at by
other processes will also qualify as probabilities and obey all the
theorems and postulates of the mathematical theory. Various re-
lated approaches to defining such "subjective" probabilities have
been exhibited over the last half-century.31 All rely on the idea of a
the three axioms, all the rules (including Bayes's Theorem) presented in all textbooks on
probability and statistics inexorably follow. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 141,
question whether the third axiom holds for "subjective" probabilities.
" For descriptions of pre-twentieth century views as to the meaning of probability, see,
for example, the authorities cited in Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 137 n.75. The
description of the competing interpretations given in the text is, for the sake of brevity, badly
oversimplified, but a more careful summary is available in V. BARNErr, supra note 10, at 62-
89. For a still more elaborate presentation, see, for example, T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABIITY
(1973). See also Hawkins, Probability, Information and Inference, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE APPLICATIONS OF BAYESIAN METHODS 11 (A. Aykac & C. Brumat eds. 1977).
"See Carnap, The Two Concepts of Probability, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 438, 450 (H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck eds. 1953).
", Informal treatments of subjective probability date back to J. BERNOULLI, ABS
CONJECTANDI (Basel 1713). Formal theories were advanced independently and almost simulta-
neously by Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti in the period 1925-1935. For example, in 1926
Ramsey used "ethically neutral propositions" to show how cardinal scales of probability and
utility could simultaneously be derived from a set of coherent preference rankings. See F.
RAMSEY, Truth and Probability, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL
ESSAYS 156 (1931). Ramsey's derivation is described in a simplified way in R..JEFFREY, THE
LOGIC OF DECISION 31-43 (1965), and his method for defining utilities was rediscovered in the
1940s by J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, supra note 19, at 15-31. For other developments
along these lines, see, for example, J. PRATT, H. RAIFFA & R. SCHLAIFER, INTRODUCTION TO
STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY (1965); L. SAVAGE, supra note 19, at 6-104; Anscombe & Au-
mann, A Definition of Subjective Probability, 34 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 199
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coherent ordering of preferences in choosing among uncertain out-
comes. Where subjective probabilities are defined in terms of the
odds a person would be willing to accept in betting on the outcome
of an event, they can be shown to obey all the rules of probability
theory, 32 at least where the judgments satisfy certain conditions of
consistency.3 For instance, a person who is indifferent between tak-
ing either side of a bet that the defendant is the murderer when
offered two-to-one odds has a subjective probability of one-third for
the likelihood of the defendant's guilt. Alternatively, subjective
probability can be defined in terms of lotteries rather than betting
odds. Under this analysis, having the subjective probability of one-
third for the likelihood of defendant's guilt is tantamount to being
indifferent between two lotteries: (a) one that offers a prize of, say,
(1963); de Finetti, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources, in STUDIES IN SUsJEC-
TIVE PROBABILITY 93 (H. Kyburg & H. Smokler eds. 1964); Giles, A Logic for Subjective Belief,
in 1 FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY THEORY, STATISTICAL INFERENCE, AND STATISTICAL THEORIES
OF SCIENCE 41 (W. Harper & C. Hooker eds. 1976); Harper, Rational Belief Change, Popper
Functions and Counterfactuals, in id. at 73; May & Harper, Toward An Optimization Proce-
dure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics, in id. at 137;
Shimony, Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation, 20 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 1 (1955); Smith,
Personal Probability and Statistical Analysis, 128 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL Soc'Y (SERIES A) 469
(1965). An engaging and compact sketch of the historical development of some subjective
probability theories can be found in H. RAIFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 273-78 (1968).
32 See, e.g., Freedman & Purves, Bayes Method for Bookies, 40 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL
STATISTIcs 1177 (1969); Kemeny, Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities, 20 J. SYMBOLC LOGIC
263 (1955); Lehman, On Confirmation and Rational Betting, 20 J. SYmBOLIC LOGIC 251 (1955);
Smith, Consistency in Statistical Inference and Decision, 23 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y
(SERIEs B) 1 (1961). Although rigorous proofs of this result are mathematically involved, the
underlying logic is easily illustrated. Consider the plight of someone whose subjective proba-
bilities do not have the requisite mathematical properties. Suppose, for instance, that they
do not obey the familiar rule that P(X) + P(not-X) = 1. For concreteness, let X stand for
the outcome that tomorrow will be a rainy day, and let us suppose that the individual asserts
that at odds of three-to-one in favor of rain he is equally willing to take either side of a $10
bet on this outcome, X. His subjective probability that tomorrow will be rainy is then 11(3+1)
= /. He further asserts that he believes that the same odds are fair in betting $10 on not-X,
the outcome that it will not rain tomorrow. This produces a subjective probability of '/ in
favor of not-X, in violation of the rule that these probabilities must sum to one. It also puts
him in the position of being certain to lose $20. This is so because he is indifferent between
either side of each bet. We therefore ask him to bet $10 against rain at the three-to-one odds
in favor of rain (the short side of the bet on X). We also ask him to bet another $10 that it
will not rain at these same odds (the long side of the bet on not-X). If it rains, he loses $30
on the first bet and wins only $10 on the second bet (since not-X has not occurred). Similarly,
if it does not rain, he wins $10 on the first bet but loses $30 on the second (since not-X has
occurred). Unless this person wishes to serve as a "money pump," he had best revise his odds
in such a way that the subjective probabilities they generate for X and not-X add up to one.
Brilmayer and Kornhauser recognize that such logic supports the use of the conventional
probability axioms with subjective probabilities "if one conceives of the decisionmaking
process as a gamble." Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 141-42 & n.93.
See, e.g., V. BARNETr, supra note 10, at 82; R. JEFFREY, supra note 31, at 42; note 19
supra.
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$100 with probability one-third and, say, $10 with probability two-
thirds, and (b) one that gives the $100 prize if the defendant is guilty
and the $10 prize if the defendant is not guilty.34
Recognizing that subjectively interpreted probabilities are logi-
cally compatible with the mathematical structure of probability
theory, 35 those who challenge their use are reduced to arguing that
such probabilities cannot be meaningfully estimated in some cir-
cumstances and, in particular, in litigation. In part, they are right.
One can construct a few intractable cases in which the choice of a
subjective probability is either impossible or must be totally arbi-
trary. A newborn child, although not entirely without information
about his environment, would have difficulty estimating probabili-
ties. A person deprived of all knowledge of physics, chemistry, biol-
ogy, and astronomy would be puzzled if asked the probability that
there are living beings on a planet orbiting the star Sirius." But
these fanciful examples put forward by Brilmayer and Kornhauser 37
3' Tribe, supra note 3, at 1346-48, describes this approach in more detail. The size of the
prizes is unimportant, as long as one prize is preferred to the other. (Where one is indifferent
between the prizes, one is also indifferent as between the two lotteries regardless of the
probabilities involved.) Yet another approach to defining subjective probability relies on the
device of bidding for a "reference contract." See R. WINKLER, INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN
INFERENCE AND DECISION 23 (1972).
1 Most "subjectivists" believe that the "objective" interpretations of probability are
subsumed within the subjective conception. Thus, in their view, one can (and in some cases
should) accept a relative frequency number as the appropriate "subjective" probability. See,
e.g., Y. CHOU, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 417-18 (2d ed. 1975); H. PAZER & H. SwANSON, MODERN
METHODS FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 17-19 (1972). Finkelstein seems to share this view, al-
though his language is ambiguous. See M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at 64. When he makes
this point, however, Brilmayer and Kornhauser accuse him of "unfamiliarity with, or disre-
gard of, an enormous body of literature on the subject." Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note
1, at 140.
31 For reasons explained in, for example, Carnap, supra note 30, at 444; J. KEYNES, A
TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 42-51 (1921); G. SHAFER, supra note 8, at 23-24; E. NAGEL, PRINCIPLES
OF THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY 46-47 (1939), this example may expose a logical flaw in the
Laplacean principle of insufficient reason. As such, it may undermine the classical, objective,
a priori interpretation of probability. See text and note at note 29 supra. Unless there are
realistic situations in which one must resort to the Laplacean principle in making subjective
estimates, however, it is no argument against subjective probabilities.
11 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 143. The authors do not actually speak of
infants making probability estimates. Instead, they state:
It seems more plausible that there are some questions for which we have no empirical
data. Unless the subjectivists would argue that we are born with information bearing
on every question that can be phrased in the English language, there must be a point at
which we received our first piece of information about any given proposition. Before that
point we had none.
Id. at 143 n.96. It is, however, difficult to conceive of any question that can be answered by
scientific investigation for which a person of more than a few years of age who has not been
reared in a state of total sensory deprivation would have no "empirical data." The data may
be extremely limited, highly peripheral, or grossly faulty, but there will almost always be
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have little bearing on the estimation of probabilities in the trial
process. Jurors are not neonates, and ample evidence should ordi-
narily be available to justify meaningful, if imperfect, probability
estimates." If such minimal evidence is not present, then the plain-
tiff has not met his burden of production, and the case should be
resolved against him.
It is true, of course, that jurors do not make book on disputed
factual issues. But those who deny that subjective probabilities are
meaningful in modeling or aiding legal factfinding must show that
the various methods of defining subjective probabilities are not
available, even in principle, in the trial context. For instance, one
can imagine quizzing a juror as to the odds governing any particular
issue. Thus, to revert to an earlier illustration, one can conceive of
demanding that the juror state the odds at which he would be will-
ing to take either side of a bet that the defendant is the murderer,
as alleged. Nevertheless, both Cohen and Brilmayer and Kornhau-
ser contend that this is not enough.39 Cohen, whose thinking on this
point is better developed, condemns such a procedure as "grossly
fallacious" for two reasons. First, he asserts, "bets must be settle-
able. In each case the outcome must be knowable otherwise than
from the data on which the odds themselves are based. When the
horse-race is finally run, the winner is photographed as he passes the
winning-post." 0 There is nothing outrageous, however, about con-
sidering what odds would be acceptable even if one has no intention
of carrying through on the bets. And, bets about facts contested at
trial could, in theory at least, be settled afterwards if society desired
to expend the resources or use sufficiently brutal methods to gather
further evidence. 4'
some information on which to base a subjective probability.
This conclusion is not affected by de Finetti's remark, cited by Brilmayer and Kornhau-
ser, that" '[aiccording to the subjective view, no problem can be correctly stated in statistics
without an evaluation of the initial probabilities.'" Id. (quoting B. DE FINErTT, PROBABILITY,
INDUCTION AND STATISTICS 143 (1972)). We are concerned at this point not with the question
whether Bayesian techniques of inference are suitable for solving every statistical problem.
That is indeed a controversial claim. The issue, rather, is whether subjective probabilities
suitable for manipulation according to Bayes's formula and other rules of mathematical
probability can be stated. As the works cited in notes 31 & 32 supra show, there can be little
serious dispute over this contention. Perhaps Brilmayer and Kornhauser have been led astray
by the fact that it is common to speak of subjective probabilities as "Bayesian" probabilities.
See note 57 infra.
But see Gerjuoy, supra note 6, at 23.
2, L. COHEN, supra note 8, at 90; Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 142 & n.93.
L. COHEN, supra note 8, at 90.
' To be sure, even after administrations of sodium pentothal, polygraph tests, torture,
or what have you, there might still be some residual uncertainty about a defendant's guilt.
But the same could be said of a horse race. The picture of the supposed winner may have
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Cohen's second point is that the odds a juror would accept
depend in part on the magnitude of the bet. 2 At first glance, this
observation seems troublesome because it suggests that persons who
are not risk neutral will be unable to settle on a single probability
characterizing their degree of belief in the outcome of a specific
event.4 3 The problem, however, is not as serious as it might seem.
To begin with, it pertains to but one of the several successful formu-
lations of subjective probability. Probabilities ascertained via the
lottery method, for example, are immune from this attack, for they
are independent of the size of the prizes involved." Moreover, even
under the betting-odds approach, the probabilities are very nearly
constant so long as the bets are small compared to the decision-
maker's total wealth.45 In addition, I would conjecture that depend-
ence of the odds on the magnitude of the bet can be circumvented
by leaving the amount of the wager indeterminate. In other words,
we elicit a person's subjective probability of an outcome by requir-
ing him to state the odds he considers fair. To make certain that the
resulting assessment is sincere and fair, we inform him that once he
provides these odds, he will have to take whatever side of the bet
we select for him, and that, furthermore, he will have to wager
whatever amount we prescribe.
been taken from an improper angle, it may have been doctored, or the laws of optics may
have been suspended by a sinister force during the exposure. It is all a matter of degree.
42 L. COHEN, supra note 8, at 90.
" In economic theory an individual is said to be risk neutral if, roughly speaking, he
values a gain of X dollars exactly as much as he abhors a loss of this magnitude. For such an
individual, the utility of money is linear, and maximizing utility is equivalent to maximizing
income. See, e.g., R. WINKLER, supra note 34, at 255. A decisionmaker who is not risk neutral,
however, cannot maximize expected utility by maximizing expected monetary return. If he
is risk averse, for instance, and the amount he must wager is large, he will select more
favorable odds (to overcome the risk of a large loss in income) than if the bet is trifling because
he finds the loss of a large amount of money disproportionately more discomforting than the
loss of a small amount. See generally B. LINDGREN, ELEMENTS OF DECISION THEORY 56-60
(1971); D. LINDLEY, MAKING DECISIONS 81-87 (1971); W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONoMIc THEORY
153-56 (1972).
" See text and note at note 34 supra.
"' Within this region, any continuous utility function is approximately linear. Maximiza-
tion of expected utility is then equivalent to maximization of expected monetary return. To
avoid an expected negative return, the decisionmaker will select the one set of odds that, he
believes, makes the bet statistically fair. E.g., R. WINKLER, supra note 34, at 24. A statistically
fair bet is one whose expected payoff in dollar terms is zero. E.g., L. CHAO, STATISTICS 118
(1974); B. LINDGREN, supra note 43, at 54. For example, betting X dollars at odds of three-to-
one that a heart will be drawn from a well-shuffled deck of playing cards is fair, since the
expected winnings are given by (a) the probability that the card will be a heart (p = 'A) times
the winnings if a heart appears (3X) plus (b) the probability that the card will not be a heart
(1 - p = '/) times the winnings if a heart is not turned up (-X):
(p)(3X) + (1-p)(-X) = '/(3X) - 3/4(X) = 0.
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Of course, the assumption that the decisionmaker must take
either side of the gamble-that he must act as a bookmaker-can
be questioned. Indeed, this is a standard objection in the literature
on subjective probability." Brilmayer and Kornhauser believe this
argument against subjective probabilities is especially powerful in
the trial setting because the decisionmaker may "consider gathering
more information."'" Yet the opposite seems to be the case. The
involuntary-bookmaker logic is particularly apt in the context of
trials. Disputed facts must be resolved then and there on the basis
of incomplete and imperfect information, and the conscientious de-
cisionmaker should be able to take either side of a bet at the odds
corresponding to his probability estimate that he has made the
correct decision. A juror who takes his job seriously can hardly fol-
low the Brilmayer-Kornhauser strategy and "consider gathering
more information about the likelihood of A and not-A, or make a
decision based on some criterion distinct from maximizing expected
value."" The numbers jurors might supply if asked to quantify their
personal beliefs can therefore be viewed as approximations of the
theoretically satisfactory probabilities. In this way, the probabilities
at work in legal factfinding can be given a conceptually meaningful
subjective interpretation.
Ill. Is SUBJECTIVISM NECESSARY?
So far I have discussed the applicability of probability theory
to the trial process in a very general way. I have tried to show that
1' As one well-known critic of subjective probability puts it,
That I will not allow a book to be made against me is entailed by my preference ranking
for money (that I'd prefer not to suffer a certain loss), and has nothing to do with my
degree of belief. Having accepted a bet at odds of (1-p):p on S, of course I won't accept
a bet at odds of (1-q):q on not-S [where p3(l-q)]. This is not to say that if I had not
accepted the first bet, I wouldn't accept the second bet. The hidden assumption required
is that the behavioral counterpart of a distribution of beliefs over an algebra of sentences
is a willingness to make book on them: to accept bets of any size, on either side, with
respect to any combination of sentences. . . . [This] puts the person whose beliefs we
are discussing in the position of the bookmaker; . . . a bookmaker had better be jolly
sure that the odds he posts satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.
H. KYBURG, THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 95-96 (1974).
,7 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 142.
1 Id. Admittedly, there are some unusual cases in which a court may choose correctly
not to let a case reach the jury even where the probability given the evidence seems, at first
blush, to exceed one-half or whatever number would justify a finding in favor of the proponent
of the evidence. This "rational strategy" of "insufficient evidence," id., does not indicate any
defect in probability theory. On the contrary, it can be explained by a Bayesian model, see
Kaye, supra note 6, at 1475-81; Kaye, supra note 18, at 106-08, and merely reflects a legal
policy designed to minimize errors in the long run by encouraging plaintiffs to produce better
evidence about the matter in dispute. See text and note at note 22 supra.
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there is nothing paradoxical or counterintuitive in thinking of legal
factfinding in terms of the mathematics of probability and that the
subjective definition of probability provides a meaningful interpre-
tation of the probabilities involved in the legal process. It is helpful,
however, to consider the Finkelstein-Fairley proposal for using prob-
ability theory in litigation in more detail. I do so not to argue in
favor of actually implementing the proposal, but rather to ask
whether the Finkelstein-Fairley suggestion requires us to interpret
the probabilities involved in a subjective way. Finkelstein, who is a
subjectivist, assumes that it does, and, it does not occur to Bril-
mayer and Kornhauser to question this assumption.49 In this sec-
tion, however, I shall suggest, with some diffidence, that recourse
to the subjective theory is not essential, and that therefore the long-
standing and esoteric debate among logicians, philosophers, and
statisticians about subjective probabilites and the probability ax-
ioms is, in the end, irrelevant to evaluating the Finkelstein-Fairley
proposal.
The problem Finkelstein and Fairley seek to solve with the
machinery of Bayes's formula is as much psychological as mathe-
matical. It is a problem that occurs in every case in which one party
seeks to introduce into evidence a quantified statement of some
crucial probability. For instance, a robbery has been committed by
a couple, and the description of the robbers is clear and definite:
they are said to be a young, white woman with blond hair and a
ponytail, and a black man with a beard and a moustache who drives
a yellow convertible. A couple meeting that description is appre-
hended, and the prosecutor offers a carefully conducted survey to
show that no more than one couple in a million fits the given de-
scription. 0 Or, to take a more common example, in a paternity
action the plaintiff offers serologic test results to establish that the
defendant and the child both have a set of genes found in only one
out of a hundred males in the general population.5' Contrary to what
one might think at first glance, these numbers do not imply that the
probability that the couple apprehended committed the robbery is
1 - 10- 1 = .999999 or that the probability that the defendant is the
father is 1 - 10- ' = .99.52 But what, then, should a jury make of these
11 See note 35 supra.
50 Cf. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (similar
probability calculation made without any survey-careful or otherwise).
1, Cf. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979) (similar statistic
derived from HLA haplotyping).
11 See, e.g., People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); Tribe,
supra note 3, at 1336 & n.23; Ellman & Kaye, supra note 5; Fairley & Mosteller, A Conversa-
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relative-frequency figures?
Finkelstein and Fairley suggest one answer: use Bayes's for-
mula to convey to the jurors the probative force of the quantitative
evidence. They illustrate their proposal by a graphic example.13
Suppose a woman's body is found in a ditch. There is evidence that
the deceased had a violent quarrel with her boyfriend the night
before. He is known to have struck her on other occasions. Investiga-
tors find the murder weapon, a knife, whose handle bears a latent
palm print similar to the defendant's. The information on the print
is limited so that an expert can say only that such prints appear in
no more than one case in a thousand. Finkelstein and Fairley believe
that the jurors will be aided in accurately assessing the total proba-
tive value of the evidence if they are first shown a chart depicting,
in numerical terms, how much the probability that the defendant
wielded the murder weapon is enhanced by the discovery of the
prints. The mathematical tool for devising such a chart is Bayes's
formula. Let X denote the event that the defendant stabbed the
deceased; let P(X) stand for the probability of this event without
regard to the palm print evidence; let P(X/E) represent the proba-
bility that the defendant stabbed the deceased, taking into account
the statistical evidence; and let P(EIX) be the probability that the
palm print would have matched, given that the defendant had ac-
tually stabbed the deceased with the knife. Then Bayes's formula
relates P(XIE) (the "posterior probability") to P(X) (the "prior
probability") as follows: 54
1




tion About Collins, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 242 (1974); Charrow & Smith, A Conversation About
"A Conversation About Collins," 64 GEO. L.J. 669 (1976).
0 Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 2, at 496.
", Any introductory text on mathematical probability includes a derivation of Bayes's
Theorem. Derivations can also be found in, for example, M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at
87-98; Gerjuoy, supra note 6, at 9-12; Kaye, supra note 6; Lempert, supra note 6, at 1022-23,
1023 & n.12; Tribe, supra note 3, at 1351-54. For the more general formulation of Bayes's
formula, see, for example, G. Box & G. Tmo, BAYESIAN INFERENCE IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
(1972); Y. CHOU, supra note 35, at 414; R. WINKLER, supra note 34, at 76, 144 (1972).
It is more common to write Bayes's formula in a slightly different form:
P(X)P(E/X)
P(X/E) = P(X)P(E/X) + [1-P(X)IP(E/not-X).
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These equations thus show how the prior probability should be
modified or "conditioned" by the new item of evidence E. For exam-
ple, if there is no doubt that the prints would match if the defendant
6sed the knife, then P(E/X) = 1. At the same time, the probability
that the prints would match given that someone else used the knife
is (neglecting the possibility of a frameup) given by P(E/not-X) =
1/1000. Thus, the ratio f defined by equation (2) is 1/1000, and
equation (1) reduces to:
1
P(X/E) = .999 + .001/P(X). (3)
If a juror believed, on the basis of all the nonquantified evi-
dence-the violent argument, the defendant's murderous propensi-
ties, and so forth-that the prior probability, P(X), is one-half, then
the equations reveal that the numerical palm print evidence has
raised the probability that the defendant used the knife to the pos-
terior probability
1
P(X/E) .999 + .001/.5
By applying equation (3) in this fashion, the effect of the statistical
evidence on any given prior probability can be calculated, and a
chart displaying the impact of the quantitative data across a broad
range of prior probabilities can be prepared. This modest use of
Bayes's formula would not require a juror to commit himself to any
specific prior probability. He could scan the chart to see how power-
ful the quantitative evidence is. In short, Finkelstein and Fairley
suggest using the Bayesian chart as a pedagogical device, which
would give the jurors some guidance in assessing the significance of
the statistical evidence.
As I remarked at the outset, whether implementation of this
modest chart approach would be workable and effective in practice
is highly debatable. 5 But the more abstract epistemological objec-
tion raised by Brilmayer and Kornhauser has little bearing on this
practical question. Contrary to what Brilmayer and Kornhauser
seem to imply,5 the objection to using subjective prior probabilities
Dividing numerator and denominator of the right hand side by P(X)P(E/X) gives the version
presented here. The f defined by equation (2) is thus the reciprocal of the "likelihood ratio"
employed by Lempert, supra note 6, at 1025.
11 See text and notes at notes 3-5 supra.
51 Brilmayer and Kornhauser seem impressed with the fact that "Bayesians" have not
yet written many elementary textbooks. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 135 n.68,
148 n.115. But see L. PHILLIPS, BAYESIAN STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (1973); S. SCHMITT,
MEASURING UNCERTAINTY: AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN STATISTICS (1969); R.
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does not deny that Bayes's Theorem is mathematically correct. 57 It
WINKLER, supra note 34. They go so far as to quote, in italics, Nagel's 1939 observation that
"few writers today take [Bayes's Theorem] seriously as a means for determining the proba-
bility of a given hypothesis on the basis of given evidence." Id. at 148 n.115 (quoting E. NAGEL,
PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF PROBABILITY 31 (1939)). Surely a truer picture is provided by G.
Box & G. TIAo, supra note 54, at 1:
Opinion as to the value of Bayes' Theorem as a basis for statistical inference has swung
between acceptance and rejection since its publication in 1763. During periods when it
was thought that alternative arguments supplied a satisfactory foundation for statistical
inference Bayesian results were viewed, sometimes condescendingly, as an interesting
but mistaken attempt to solve an important problem. When subsequently it was found
that initially unsuspected difficulties accompanied the alternatives, interest was rekin-
dled. Bayes' mode of reasoning, finally buried on so many occasions, has recently risen
again with astonishing vigor.
Furthermore, as Schum observes in his review of Cohen's book:
I cannot agree that the subjective interpretation of probability appeals to few researchers
in the natural and social sciences. I find it hard to believe that the author is innocent of
the prevalence of the subjective interpretation of probability in the decision-theoretic
areas of economics, business, medicine, and psychology. In these and other areas many
researchers would prefer to use Bayesian statistical methods for analysis and interpreta-
tion of data but do not because they also wish to have their papers accepted by journal
editors who, all too frequently, adhere to classical statistical approaches based on a
relative-frequency interpretation of probability and reject other approaches, not always
for informed reasons.
Schum, supra note 16, at 478.
" Bayes's Theorem is part and parcel of the theory of probability presented in every
elementary text on the subject. It is all but implicit in the very definition of conditional
probability. It can be used with either objectively or subjectively determined probabilities.
See, e.g., G. Box & G. Tmo, supra note 54, at 12-20; Y. CHOU, supra note 35, at 412.
The dispute about "Bayesian methods," Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 135
n.68, is quite different. It pertains to the sticky problem of statistical inference, or the formu-
lation of generalizations (or statements about population parameters) on the strength of
sample data. The "classical" or "orthodox" school, originating with R.A. Fisher, J. Neyman,
E.S. Pearson, and others, relies on the techniques of point (or interval) estimation and
hypothesis testing. Roughly speaking, classical statistics utilizes sample data as its only
source of relevant information. Bayesian inference, on the other hand, demands the process-
ing of prior information as well as sample data. The prior information is modified by the
sample data through the repeated use of Bayes's Theorem. See 1 D. LINDLEY, INTRODUCTION
TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS xi (1965). For an overyiew of the different approaches to this
and related problems, see H. RAIFFA, supra note 31, at 278-88.
If Brilmayer and Kornhauser, and others who challenge the use of the probability axioms
in the domain of law, were right, then classical as well as Bayesian statistics in litigation
would be suspect. Whether or not Brilmayer and Kornhauser recognize this is unclear. They
imply that there are "schools of statistics" that do not rest on the axioms given at note 28
supra, Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 136-37. They take examples from L. COHEN,
supra note 8, that, if valid, undermine both classical and Bayesian inference; they then act
as if only "Bayesian assumptions" and "Bayesian proof schemes" are implicated. Brilmayer
& Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 145 & n.103.
It is unfortunate that the use of the term "Bayesian" in the literature is so unstructured
as to encourage such errors. Cf. note 37 supra (confusion regarding subjective and "Bayesian"
probabilities). To quote the tongue-in-cheek remark of one statistician, "while non-Bayesians
should make it clear in their writing whether they are non-Bayesian Orthodox or non-
Bayesian Fisherian, Bayesians should also take care to distinguish their various denomina-
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asserts only that the prior probability one proposes to use in equa-
tion (1) is somehow not a "true" probability and that the resulting
posterior probability is therefore also not a "real" probability. That
is, it contends that even in theory jurors cannot produce by subjec-
tive methods a number that qualifies as a "real" probability suita-
ble for manipulation by valid mathematical theorems.
Two replies to this criticism are available. First, the objection
misses the point of the modest chart approach. That approach does
not ask the jurors to produce any number, let alone one that can
qualify as a probability. It merely shows them how a "true" prior
probability would be altered, if one were in fact available. It thus
supplies the jurors with as precise and accurate an illustration of the
probative force of the quantitative data as the mathematical theory
of probability can provide. Such a chart, it can be maintained,
should have pedagogical value to the juror who evaluates the entire
package of evidence solely by intuitive methods, and who does not
himself attempt to assign a probability to the "soft" evidence.
The other, more fundamental response is that there appears to
be no reason in principle why a juror could not generate a prior
probability that could be described in terms of the objective,
relative-frequency sort of probability. One could characterize the
juror's prior probability as an estimate of the proportion of cases in
which a defendant confronted with the same pattern of nonquanti-
tative evidence as exists in the case at bar would in fact turn out to
have stabbed the deceased." As Brilmayer and Kornhauser empha-
tions of Bayesian Epistemologist, Bayesian Orthodox, and Bayesian Savages." Bartlett,
Discussion on Professor Pratt's Paper, 27 J. RoYAL STATISTICAL Soc'Y (SERiES B) 192, 197
(1965).
58 The probability that the defendant used the knife to kill the deceased, conditioned on
all the evidence presented to the jury, can be given a similar, relative-frequency interpreta-
tion. Imagine 100 homicide cases in which identical evidence is presented. The same facts
are testified to by persons with the same demeanors and the same grounds for their testimony.
To assert that the probability that the state's allegation (that the defendant wielded the
knife) is true given all this information in a particular case is, say, 1/2, means that in 50 of
the 100 cases the defendants actually stabbed the victims and that in the remaining 50 they
did not. If the jurors had more evidence in some of these 100 cases, they might be able to
decide into which group a particular case would be more likely to fall. But, by hypothesis,
they do not have such information, and each of the 100 cases looks identical, so the relative-
frequency calculation must be based on all 100 cases.
An analogy can be made to the problem of stating (without peeking) the probability that
a given coin, out of 100 coins flipped at once, has come up heads. To say that this probability
is 1/2 is to assert, in relative-frequency terms, that 50 of the coins showed heads and that the
remaining 50 turned up tails. If one had more information about some of the coins' equations
of motion, a different probability might be calculated. But, by hypothesis, one has identical
evidence in each case and knows only that each coin was flipped in the same general way, at
the same time, and onto the same surface.
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size, the number so conceived is only an approximation of the
"true" proportion or probability,59 and there is no workable, inde-
pendent method by which the accuracy of the juror's estimate could
be measured. 0 But this practical difficulty does not undercut the
conceptual point. Even a more direct measure of relative frequency
can be faulty. An "objectivist" who estimates the probability that
a woman will bear a male child by sampling to find the proportion
of newborns who are male may also make mistakes. He may mis-
identify'the sex, miscount, or misrecord the data. Naturally, to the
extent the probabilities inserted in Bayes's formula are erroneous,
so too will be the posterior probability it generates.' But this is an
operational concern.62 As important as it may be in coming to a
decision about the desirability of implementing the procedure, it
does not suggest any conceptual defect in the use of the formula.
The juror can have the same confidence in the number produced by
the formula as he does in the prior probability he estimates. And
presumably, jurors already do make such estimates, even if not in
numerical terms. 63
IV. WHAT is RATIONAL?
Still, Brilmayer and Kornhauser ask, why is it "rational" to
believe that the formula works correctly?64 Might not a formula
derived from another set of axioms provide a more rational solution
to the problem of modifying prior probabilities? If Brilmayer and
Kornhauser are using the term "rational" in a conventional way,65
" Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 140-41.
" There are some conceivable but socially undesirable methods of verification. See note
41 supra. This observation serves to counter the contention that a juror's estimate is untesta-
ble even in principle and is therefore meaningless.
11 Mathematically, the uncertainty in the estimation of the prior probability can be
expressed, more or less, by using a "spread out" prior-probability mass or density function,
f(X), instead of a single number P(X), to produce, according to Bayes's Theorem, a posterior-
probability mass or density function, g(X/E), instead of a single posterior-probability num-
ber, P(X/E). See, e.g., G. Box & G. TIAo, supra note 54, at 10-11.
,2 It is, as Tribe, supra note 3, at 1358-59, observes, one of the reasons that implementa-
tion of the Finkelstein-Fairley proposal might convey a false sense of precision to the jurors.
Cf. Gerjuoy, supra note 6, at 39 ("a sensible quantitative measure of relevance in terms of
probabilities can be formulated, but . . .Bayesian-computed probabilities will very rarely
...be useful for deciding on the relevance of evidence profferred during actual litigation").
,0 See, e.g., Schwartz, Decision Analysis: A Look at the Chief Complaints, 300 NEw
ENGLAND J. MED. 556, 557 (1979).
' Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 135-36.
"3 On the conventional meaning of the word, see J. BENNETT, RATIONALITY (1964); C.
HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 463-86 (1965); H. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC
MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR MICROECONOMIcS 71-94 (1976); J. VON NEUMANN & 0.
MORGENSTERN, supra note 19, at 8; J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 142-50 (1971); A. SEN,
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there can be no direct mathematical or empirical demonstration
that using probability theory to combine the statistical evidence
with the juror's estimate of the prior probability is more "rational"
than deducing the posterior probability by methods that reject the
usual principles of statistical reasoning. That is because rationality
is a normative concept not amenable to empirical measurement.6"
A theory of rational behavior does not "predict" anything empiri-
cally measurable.67 It only prescribes how one should behave if one
wishes to conform to that theory's conception of rationality. 8 The
"rational man" of economic theory, for example, always acts to
maximize utility, and his utility function is monotonic and quasi-
concave.69 Observations of individuals whose behavior is not
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 34 (1970); Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes,
60 J. PHILOSOPHY 685 (1963);'Gibson, Rationality, 6 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 193 (1977);
Mabbott, Reason and Desire, 28 PHILOSOPHY 113 (1953); Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioral Foundations of the Economic Theory, 6 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977);
note 19 supra.
" Brilmayer and Kornhauser seem to think otherwise. They cite the example of poker-
playing compuier programs to support their surprising view that "theories about what consti-
tute a rational approach" can be "validated" by "empirical testing of the theory's predic-
tions." Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 135. Perhaps their use of the word
"rational" is imprecise, and what they meant to say is that one can test whether one decision-
making strategy works better than another in meeting specified criteria such as beating one's
opponent in poker. Certainly, one can "validate" the "accuracy" of a particular poker-playing
algorithm in this way. Cf. note 73 infra (citing to studies of the relative accuracy of formal
statistical methods and intuitive judgments). But one cannot demonstrate empirically that
it is "rational" to beat one's opponent in poker. See generally, Oppenheim, Rational Deci-
sions and Intrinsic Valuations, in NoMos VII-RATONAL DECISION 217 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964).
17 A theory of rational behavior can, of course, be used descriptively, to model actual
behavior. See, e.g., C. CooMaS, R. DAWES & A. TVERSKY, supra note 19, at 122-29; Hogarth,
Cognitive Processes and the Assessment of Subjective Probability Distributions, 70 J. AM.
STATISTICAL A. 271 (1975); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory, 28
ANN. REV. PSYCH. 1, 13-17 (1977). Indeed, the National Science Foundation is funding an
investigation by David Schum, a mathematical psychologist at Rice University, of whether
probability judgments involving the kind of evidence that might be used in a trial setting
are better described by the calculus proposed by L. COHEN, supra note 8, or by ordinary
probability theory.
The proposal to use Bayes's formula in legal factfinding, however, does not purport to
describe how jurors do behave. It is concerned with how they should behave. Thus it does
not rely on the assumption that the processing of probabilistic information by real jurors
reflects that prescribed by Bayes's formula. Rather, it assumes that more accurate factfinding
will occur if the technique is implemented. See note 73 infra. Cf. de Finetti, supra note 31,
at 111 n.e ("probability theory is not an attempt to describe actual behavior; its subject is
coherent behavior, and the fact that people are only more or less coherent is inessential").
"1 See, e.g., C. COOMBS, R. DAWES & A. TVERSKY, supra note 19, at 122; A. RAPOPORT,
STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE (1964); Lempert, supra note 6, at 1023. Recognizing the normative
quality of theories of rational behavior, a number of authors have attempted to develop a
"metaethics" of rational choice. See, e.g., Anderson, The Place of Principles in Policy
Analysis, 73 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 711, 715-23 (1979).
1, See generally W. NICHOLSON, supra note 43, at 43-53.
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"predicted" by this model-for example, a Buddhist monk who
shuns worldly possessions or a Kung San tribesman who wants no
more than an ample supply of mongongo nuts-cannot disprove
the economist's belief that a "rational man" will behave as his
theory demands."
Of course, Brilmayer and Kornhauser may be using "rational"
in some special but unstated way. It would appear that they con-
ceive of "rationality" in a limited "means-end" or instrumental
sense, and that their criticism can be restated more clearly as fol-
lows: Why should we accept the axioms of probability theory as
generating the most accurate solution to the problem of modifying
prior probabilities-especially those that are ascertained by subjec-
tive methods? One answer is frankly intuitionist. One can simply
insist that the axioms (or some higher-level postulates) are intui-
tively satisfying.' Needless to say, it is notoriously difficult to con-
vince determined skeptics by this retort. Fortunately, a pragmatic
response is also available. 7- The equations of the axiomatized theory
of probability-like the rules of logic and arithmetic-work admira-
bly in other contexts. Physicists, engineers, economists, geneticists,
businessmen, actuaries, bookmakers, and casino operators prove,
day in and day out, that the mathematical theory provides more
useful and more accurate predictions of important phenomena than
any alternative methods. Surely the probability axioms work suffi-
ciently well for objectively estimated probabilities. Why should they
not serve as well when applied to thoughtful, subjective estimates?
Perhaps the laws of probability really are suspended in the court-
room, but the burden of proof should fall on those who claim that
other ways of reasoning about probabilities may be more accurate. 73
10 See, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA.
L. REV. 451, 457 (1974); W. NICHOLSON, supra note 43, at 155-56.
7 See note 19 supra.
7, One student of probability theory expressed the pragmatic position clearly when he
observed that "a bookmaker bad better be jolly sure that the odds he posts satisfy the axioms
of the probability calculus." H. KYBaG, supra note 46, at 96. See also text and notes at notes
19-20, 32 supra.
" There is a sizeable body of experimental work suggesting that more accurate predic-
tions about complex matters are made by formal statistical methods than by intuitively
inspired judgments. See Underwood, supra note 26, at 1423-24. There is also an interesting
body of literature attesting to the value of using Bayes's formula (often with probabilities
obtained from relative-frequency data) in medical diagnoses. See, e.g., Diamond & Forrester,
Analysis of Probability as an Aid in the Clinical Diagnosis of Coronary-Artery Disease, 300
NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1350 (1979); Gustafson, Evaluation of Probabilistic Information Pro-
cessing in Medical Decision Making, 4 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HuMAN PERFORMANCE 20
(1969); Rifkin & Hood, Bayesian Analysis of Electrocardiographic Exercise Stress Testing,
297 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 681 (1977). Furthermore, empirical Bayes techniques have proved
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The critics who oppose using the laws of probability in the court-
room and those who have formulated theories of alternative mathe-
matical structures for calculating probabilities have not yet met this
burden.
effective in predicting the performance of applicants to law school. See Rubin, Using
Empirical Bayes Techniques in the Law School Validity Studies, 75 J. Am. STATISTIcAL A.
(forthcoming).
In any event, if the point Brilmayer and Kornhauser mean to raise by their discussion
of rational models is the question whether formal statistical techniques like Bayesian analysis
would improve the performance of lay persons in evaluating probabilistic information cor-
rectly, their skepticism about the probability axioms remains mysterious. Even if such proce-
dures did not work well under courtroom conditions, the fault, to paraphrase Cassius's remark
to Brutus, might not lie with the probability axioms but with those persons trying to act as
the axioms prescribe. Cf. de Finetti, supra note 31, at 111 n.e ("It is . . . natural that
mistakes are common in the. . . complex realm of probability; nevertheless. .. ,fundamen-
tally, people behave according to the rules of coherence even though they frequently violate
them (just as [they depart from the rules of] arithmetic and logic).").
